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An Economic Approach to Voluntary Association 
 
 
 
 We develop an economic model of association based on voluntary contributions. 
Different equilibria corresponding to the different modes of formation of associations are 
analyzed and the results are compared with the existing empirical literature. The main 
contribution consists in analyzing voluntary associations as a means of providing collective-
consumption goods or services while allowing for some heterogeneity of preferences concerning 
the quality of these goods or services. Thus we introduce the concept of subjective quality as a 
possible incentive for volunteering. The model stresses the importance of non-pecuniary rewards 
and of accepted differentiation for the well-functioning of voluntary organizations. 
 
 
 Voluntary Association; Public Good; Volunteering. 
JEL classification:   L3; H4; D7.   
 
 
 
The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, 
 to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; 
 in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. 
  If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling  
by the encouragement of a great example,  they form a society… 
 
Alexis deTocqueville, “Democracy in America” 
1.  Introduction 
 
Voluntary monetary contributions and voluntary work constitute an important resource 
for the functioning of associations. According to Havens et al. (2006), in the United States, about 
90 percent of American households donate to nonprofits. In 2001, individual contributions 
accounted for 13.7 percent of the total resources of American nonprofits, while public support 
represented 9.9 percent (Tax Foundation, 2005.) Voluntary contributions are not necessarily 
monetary. They can also be represented by contributions in effort or time. In 1993, for instance, 
the value of voluntary work in the American nonprofits was estimated at about 182 billion 
dollars.  
The voluntary sector is considered as an extra-governmental provider of collective 
consumption goods representing an alternative for unsatisfied demanders (Weisbrod, 1977, 
1986.) It can be distinguished from the public and the private sectors by its means of providing 
goods and services. The public provision of goods or services is financed by compulsory taxes, 
while on the market individuals have to pay their consumption. With voluntary provision, on the 
other hand, individuals can choose to contribute to the provision of a good or service, whether 
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they consume it or not (Olson, 1971, Sugden, 1984), by forming voluntary associations (or 
nonprofits). 
 Under purely economic reasoning, voluntary associations were initially considered as 
segregated groups that arise for the mutual benefit of their members, allowing them to share 
collectively provided goods that could not be provided individually or that are better provided in 
a collective way. In this economic perspective, associations are considered as closed “clubs”, 
where the “local public good” is provided exclusively to its members and the quantity is the same 
for everyone (Buchanan, 1965, McGuire, 1974). On the other hand, in the sociological 
perspective, voluntary associations were considered as serving not only the membership, but also 
the “public-in-contact” or “public-at-large” (Ross, 1972, Olson, 1971). During the last two 
decades, the border between the two approaches has become blurred, with the growing 
development of empirical studies on voluntary contributions and volunteering and with the 
introduction of notions of impure altruism and warm glow for giving (Andreoni, 1989). In this 
perspective, in contrast to the theory of club goods, individual contributions are not perfect 
substitutes, meaning that individuals can be concerned about their private provision as well as 
about the total amount of public goods (Bergstrom et al., 1986). This implies that public funding 
for instance does not completely crowd out individual contributions. 
The example of the voluntary sector illustrates the fact that although voluntary 
contributions alone are often insufficient to make possible the provision of public goods, they 
cannot be ignored by economists. According to standard public good theory, the amount of the 
good provided through voluntary contributions will be sub-optimal because of free-riding. In 
theory, when agents are considered as pure altruists (Andreoni, 1989), i.e. when they are 
interested only in the total outcome of the collective action, public support leads to the complete 
crowding-out of voluntary contributions. However, empirical studies show that voluntary 
contributions are not completely crowded-out by public financial support. Moreover, in 
experimental studies, complete free-riding is not observed. Experimental studies allow to 
distinguish between different determinants of voluntary contributions. Generally, these studies 
show that communication (for instance cheap-talk, negotiation or promises) and the absence of 
anonymity tend to increase voluntary contributions (Andreoni and Petrie, 2003.) Other social 
determinants, such as certain individual characteristics (Glaeser et al., 2000), cooperative values 
versus individualistic values (Offermann et al., 1996), socio-economic environment (Carpenter et 
al., 2004, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) also influence the provision of public goods. Clearly, the 
majority of experimental studies shed particular light on the influence of social factors in the 
provision of public goods.  
Empirical studies in the voluntary sector focus largely on the factors influencing donors' 
behavior. These factors include state support of the provision of public goods, the total provision 
of public goods, the fund-raising expenditure of nonprofits and individual motivations. An 
interesting feature of the voluntary sector is that governmental support of the public provision of 
public goods does not crowd-out individual contributions. In some cases, one can even observe 
some crowding-in. Okten and Weisbrod (2000) find no significant parameters of crowding-out in 
the United States. Furthermore, they find that the area of higher education and research presents 
some crowding-in effects. In a study of international relief and development organizations, Ribar 
and Wilhelm (2002) show that contributions to these organizations are only weakly affected by 
public support, but they are positively influenced by fund-raising expenditure. In experimental 
studies, the crowding-out is greater, but still incomplete. As Andreoni suggested (1993), this is 
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due to the intentional elimination of social factors in experiments.  
Another interesting feature is that voluntary organizations are recognized as being capable 
of revealing demands and practicing price discrimination, or personalized prices (Hansmann, 
1980; Ben-Ner, 1986.) The concept of Lindahl equilibria using personalized prices shows that if 
such a price system is established, then efficiency can be attained in the provision of the public 
good. Ben-Ner (1986) pointed out that social relationships between the members, the constraint 
of non-distribution of benefits and the shared backgrounds of members all help nonprofits to 
establish personalized prices. 
In this paper, we develop a model of voluntary association where monetary contributions 
can be combined with volunteering. Firstly, we consider a standard public good model where 
individuals can make voluntary monetary contributions. We derive some interesting properties 
concerning overcrowding, incentives, and the existence of different equilibria resulting from the 
different ways in which association can emerge.  
Secondly, the concept of subjective quality is introduced into the basic model. The 
originality of the model is that we assume the public good to be characterized by at least two 
main components, namely the quantity and the quality. The quantity is considered here as a 
purely public component, insofar as all the members benefit equally from it. However, the quality 
of the public good is considered as a mixed (public and private) component. The agents can enjoy 
part of it in the same way, but there may exist certain characteristics of quality that are difficult or 
impossible to measure objectively. In a way, quality is always somewhat subjective, to the extent 
that perfect correspondence with the preferences of heterogeneous agents is unlikely to occur. In 
our model, the agents can contribute money or time and effort. The latter, or volunteering, allows 
them to influence the quality of the provided good (or service) according to their own 
preferences. The aim of the model is to better understand the functioning of voluntary 
organizations, in particular some recurring problems often faced by nonprofit managers:  
membership and volunteer recruitment and retention, or decline in volunteering (Cuskelly et al., 
2006, Costa et al., 2006).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and the conditions 
relating to overcrowding. Section 3 analyzes the individual and collective incentives to make 
voluntary contributions. Section 4 shows the existence of different symmetric equilibria. Section 
5 introduces the heterogeneity of incomes and shows the existence of non-symmetric equilibria 
both without and then with budget constraints. In section 6 we introduce volunteering and the 
concept of subjective quality. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  The Basic Model 
   
The model presented in this section is an extension of a standard public good model. We 
consider a set of N agents i = 1…N with N >1, who are members of an association. In what 
follows, N denotes the size of the association. The number of members must be higher than one, 
by definition of an association. Each agent is endowed with an income wi, which can be used for 
private consumption and for the provision of a public good G. All the members have to pay a 
compulsory amount c, on top of which each member can add a voluntary pecuniary contribution 
di in order to increase production of the public good. At this stage, the utility function of each 
agent can be written as follows:  
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The variable X has a double economic meaning. A positive value is interpreted as a fixed 
amount of monetary resources coming from exogenous origins (public grants, for instance.) A 
negative X describes the net amount of fixed costs (fixed costs less exogenous resources).  
The parameters α and θ describe the production technology of the public good 
contributing to the individual utility, in the non-linear and linear forms respectively. The 
parameter α can be interpreted in terms of more or less important decreasing returns. The 
parameter θ is always positive, because contributing to the good is assumed to generate a positive 
externality. The introduction of this parameter allows to vary the attractiveness of the good. In 
fact, as has been noted in some experimental studies, the attractiveness of a public good can 
positively influence individual voluntary contributions to it (Hichri and Kirman, 2007).  
The parameter γ denotes the publicness of the provided good by measuring its degree of 
rivalry (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Blecha, 1987). A γ tending towards zero corresponds to 
decreasing rivalry of the public good. At one extreme, γ  equal to zero describes the case of a 
collective-consumption good in the sense of Samuelson (1954). This good is completely non-
rival and its consumption by one agent does not prevent others from consuming it. Think for 
instance of an environmental association campaigning against pollution, or an association 
fighting a disease. In these cases, each member benefits from the totality of the results of the 
collective action. On the contrary, a γ equal to 1 describes a completely rival good, equivalent to 
a collectively provided private good equally shared among the members. As an illustration, this 
type of function may correspond to the running of housing cooperatives, fairly wide-spread 
nonprofit organizations in countries like Canada or Switzerland. 
 
2.1 The Question of Overcrowding 
 
 The existence of an association is conditioned by the returns individuals might expect in terms of 
improvement of their utility function UiG when contributing to the production of a public good 
jointly with the other members. These are expected to be increasing at least until a certain size of 
the association.  
 
Definition 1 
By overcrowding we mean the situation where the individual benefit, for each member, from the 
public good provided diminishes as the number of members grows.  
In our model, overcrowding may occur under certain conditions related to the size N of the 
association and to the parameters α and γ characterizing the production and the sharing rule of the 
public good.  
The case of γ equal to zero implies the absence of overcrowding, insofar as it describes a 
pure public good (Samuelson, 1954). To understand overcrowding effects when γ is strictly 
positive, we study the variations of the production function (2) with the number of members N.  
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  Proposition 1: In the absence of fixed costs (namely when X ≥ 0) there is no overcrowding. 
More precisely:   
    - if γ ≥ α, returns to contribution decrease with the size of the association as the sharing 
rule cancels out the marginal gain expected from any individual contribution. No association of 
any size can be formed.  
    - if γ < α, there exists a threshold N1 beyond which any additional contribution 
increases individual utility. Thus, there is no overcrowding but there exists a minimal size which 
is necessary for association to occur.  
 
An interesting point resulting from this proposition is that, in line with many empirical 
findings, exogenous resources X (such as government support) do not crowd out individual 
contributions, as the threshold N1 above which overcrowding may appear is an increasing 
function of X. Thus, the size of association increases with an increase in exogenous resources.   
 
Proposition 2:  In the presence of fixed costs, (namely if X < 0) there can exist an 
overcrowding when γ > α. More precisely:   
    - if  γ ≤ α, there exists a threshold N0 beyond which any additional individual 
contributing increases individual utility;  
    - if γ > α  an association may occur  only if the population size N ≥ N0. Beyond the 
threshold N1 there is overcrowding.  
  
Proofs are presented in Appendix A. We begin by assuming symmetrical voluntary 
contributions. Then we study the sign of the production function with respect to N in different 
configurations (fixed costs versus exogenous resources). To summarize, the sign of the 
derivatives of the production function varies as follows:   
 
Table 1: The size of the association and overcrowding 
 
N 
                  c
XN
′
−=0
                                         
          
c
XN
′−
− )(=1 αγ
γ
 
dN
df
 
Undefined > 0 
Association without 
overcrowding 
0 < 0 
Overcrowding 
 
Note: Where c′ = c+d, with d the symmetrical voluntary contribution.  
 
At this stage, propositions 1 and 2 can be summarized as in table 2.   
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Table 2: Overcrowding 
   
 Cases 0>X
 
0<X
  
 
αγ <
 
No overcrowding No overcrowding 
αγ >
 
Association may not 
occur 
Overcrowding 
 
 
We then extend the scope of the results by considering the internal dynamics of the 
association. Olson (1971) has already stressed the role of the internal structure of associations, 
and in particular its impact on the group's capacity to organize the provision of public goods. 
These internal structures can bring some formal or informal coordination to the process of 
providing the public good or organizing a collective action. An informal coalition can be created 
by individuals who decide to provide the public good even if they have to support the total cost, 
or at least a higher cost than the others. According to Olson, such coalitions can be formed in 
relatively large groups. In this case, the public good may be provided even in non-structured 
groups, as some participants may be able to provide the public good to the entire group through a 
leadership commitment. More recently, Ray and Vohra (2001) for instance study cooperation in 
the provision of public goods by allowing agents to write binding agreements to form coalitions.  
To take into account this type of internal dynamics, in a first extension, we demonstrate that the 
results obtained above hold when K first members, founders for instance that can be also called 
“committed agents”, each make a fixed voluntary contribution while newcomers (i > K), or 
“involved agents”, only contribute the compulsory amount c. 
Then we allow the possibility for i > K members to make a positive voluntary 
contribution, by letting the latter vary for any i ≤ K. We show that the general case results 
obtained above hold with these new extensions. 
 
2.2 Incentives 
  
 For the rest of the paper we now consider X ≥ 0 and γ < α. The question we address now 
concerns individual and collective incentives to contribute beyond the compulsory amount c, in 
relation to the size of the association. This size can influence the incentives for agents to 
contribute individually or collectively, in a coordinated manner, via its effects on individual and 
collective returns. The attractiveness of the public good can depend on the number of persons 
sharing it. So what we are interested in here, on the individual side, is the marginal return on the 
voluntary contribution of an thN  newcomer. On the collective side, we look at the individual 
return for each member of a group of N individuals who have decided jointly to contribute. 
 
Definition 2: We define the positive return of a newcomer as an "individual incentive" to 
contribute to the public good. 
 
Definition 3:”Collective incentive” is defined as a positive return for each member 
resulting from a collective decision to increase the level of their individual contributions.  
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Proposition 3:  The “individual incentive” to contribute is at least N times weaker than 
the “collective incentive”. The “individual incentive” assumes that:  
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The “collective incentive” assumes that: 
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The right-hand side is decreasing with N so the condition for collective incentive is getting easier 
as the size of the association grows  
  (5) 
For proof see Appendix B. 
   
   Example As a simple illustration, let us take the case where X =0 and 0=id∑ . By 
substituting this in (3) and (4), we obtain the conditions for the individual incentives:  
  
)(1
1
1 )( γαα
θα
−−
−
≤
c
N  
 and for the collective incentives:  
 
γα
α
θα
−
−
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11
)(cN
 
 
The figure below shows how the number of participants N varies with the amount c of dues, for  
θ = 4,  γ = 0.4, following two different values of α ∈ ] γ ,1 [ . 
 
 
The two graphs below (Figure 1) indicate the size N of the association, below which members 
have incentives to provide voluntary contributions individually and above which members have 
incentives to contribute jointly. Comparison of the two graphs reveals the effect of the production 
technology of the public good on the incentives. The more efficient the production technology, 
the better the conditions for voluntary contributions: the higher the maximum size below which 
the members have incentives to contribute individually and, reciprocally, the lower the minimum 
size above which members have incentives to contribute collectively. For both sides, a higher 
level of compulsory dues rather diminishes the incentives for voluntary contributions. 
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Figure 1: Illustration: N  as a function of c  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Corollary 2.1 To each size N of voluntary association corresponds an optimal level of fee 
),,,(* γαXNc
. This level increases with the size N of the association. 
 
 Proof is given in Appendix B. 
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3.  Symmetric Equilibria 
 
Voluntary associations, as defined by Rose (1965), develop “when a small group of 
people, finding they have a certain interest (or purpose) in common, agree to meet and act 
together in order to try to satisfy that interest or achieve this purpose” (p. 390).  In fact, as noted 
by Ross (1972), this definition is more appropriate to the originators or leaders in some 
associations rather than the whole membership, or for certain expressive associations (clubs, 
sports associations).  
In this section, we consider the different equilibria corresponding to different social 
modalities of formation of associations that resemble the definition above. We confine our 
attention to two particular modes of emergence of association where agents choose to act not as 
individuals, but as members of a group, acting under a “common knowledge of solidarity” 
(Bacharach, 1999).  
 In the first mode, the members can decide together to contribute an equal amount. In the 
second, some members can form a “coalition” of contributors. The latter can be likened to the 
leaders or originators of the association. Thus, using Bacharach’s terms, we consider a “we-
frame” reasoning, which, in contrast to the “I-frame” reasoning, asks “What should we do?” 
instead of the more standard “What should I do?” (Bacharach, 2006). Depending on the position 
of the originators or leaders with regard to the action undertaken, one can distinguish between 
associations "for self" and "for others". In the first case, the members self-organize with no 
distinction between a dominant category of active members and beneficiaries. In the organization 
"for others", on the contrary, there is a differentiation a priori between so-called "weak" and 
"strong" categories of agents (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997, p. 288.)  
 
These modes of emergence affect the internal functioning of the organization. In 
associations whose members are not the direct beneficiaries, it is common to observe some 
detachment of "weak" categories from the "strong" actors. In this kind of organization, the 
mobilization of passive beneficiaries becomes an important issue for management. In self-
organized associations, on the contrary, the difficulty consists in reaching a consensus between 
the "strong actors" and pursuing the joint action in a sustained manner (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 
1997, p. 290).  
In the model proposed here, these situations are considered using the concepts of different 
equilibria. The N-symmetric equilibrium can be considered as the most socially desired result, in 
that it implies equal contributions from each member. It corresponds to the case of an association 
where all the participants belong to the same category of actors.  
However, as Olson (1971) noted, an internal coalition can be formed, whose members 
make additional voluntary contributions. This situation can correspond to the case of the 
association "for others", with a distinction between "strong" and "weak" categories of 
participants. This kind of association is studied using the concept of K-symmetric equilibrium. 
Finally, introducing a budget constraint allows us to analyze the partial K-symmetric equilibrium. 
In this case, the members belonging to the coalition of volunteers can each make an equal 
voluntary contribution, while members whose incomes do not allow them to contribute at the 
same level contribute less.  
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3.1  N-symmetric equilibrium 
 
In the case of N-symmetric equilibrium, the voluntary contribution
 
 Niddi ∈∀=  is 
equivalent to a voluntary increase in dues, raising them from c to dcc +′ = . Here we make an 
explicit distinction between a N-symmetric equilibrium based on individual isolated decisions (an 
“I-frame” framework) and a N-symmetric equilibria that can result from a “we-frame” 
framework, here called a “coalized N-symmetric equilibrium”. 
 
Definition 4: We define a coalized N-symmetric equilibrium as an equilibrium in which 
the N members of an association take a collective decision about the level of their individual 
voluntary contributions.  
 
Proposition 4: Without budget constraint, there exists a unique N-symmetric equilibrium 
of the voluntary contribution *d  whose value is increasing in θ and α and decreasing in c and X.   
 
For X=0 (and more widely X≤0), *d  is decreasing with N. 
For X>0, there exists a value N* under which d* is decreasing with N and above which d* 
is increasing with N. N* is an increasing function of θ and a decreasing function of X. 
 
Proof is given in Appendix C. 
   
Example: Sign of *d : *d  is constrained to a positive or zero value. Due to the concavity of the 
utility function (X≥0 and α ∈] 0,1[ ), a negative value of d resulting from the first order condition 
will give d*=0 because the utility function is thus decreasing for any d ≥ 0.   
At the limit, d=0 ⇔  0)( 1
1
1
1
1
=−+ −−
+
− αα
γ
α
γ
θαXNcN  (6) 
 
To illustrate this, let us take the case where αγ −1= , then equation (6) becomes  
0=)( 1
1
2 αθα −−+ XNCN    that has a negative and a positive root .
−
N  
Thus, d is negative for any size 
−
< NN  and positive for 
−
> NN .  
Then, d*=0   
−
≤∀ NN  and 0* >d  
−
>∀ NN . 
Thus, 
−
N is a threshold above which there exists a N-symmetric equilibrium with positive 
voluntary contributions.   
Proposition 5: In the absence of budget constraint, there exists a unique N-symmetric 
coalized equilibrium of voluntary contributions dN whose value is increasing in N, θ and α and 
11 
decreasing in c and X. 
 
Proof is given in Appendix C 
 
Example  Sign of Nd . Let us consider the case where α =2/3 and γ =1/3 (thus γ =1-α ). 
d=0 ⇔ 0=)
3
2( 23 XCNN −−   (7) 
Equation (7) admits a negative and a positive root 
=
N . Thus d is negative when N>
=
N . 
Then, 
=
N represents the threshold above which a grand-coalition tends to generate a 
positive voluntary contribution.   
 
Proposition 6: Coalized versus individual-based equilibrium 
For any size of the association, a coalized N-symmetric equilibrium gives rise to higher voluntary 
contributions than a non-coalized one.  Proof is given in Appendix C.  
 
The considerations above concern the choice of the size of the association. Members may have 
incentives to recruit new members rather than reducing their dues, which might also mean 
reducing the scope of the collective action. This may be the case for the organizations Olson 
wrote about, which almost always welcome newcomers (Olson, 1971, p. 59.) Depending on the 
level of dues and on the structure of distribution of agents’ incomes, it may be more or less 
difficult to attract new members. Furthermore, when there are criteria for joining an association, 
this may limit its accessibility to potential members. Gordon and Babchuk (1959), who studied 
these membership criteria, identified the criteria of merit (as in the American Sociological 
Society, for instance) and the criteria of attributes, such as gender (e.g. feminist associations), 
origins or culture (for instance an association of Ukrainians), or simply certain social links 
between members.  
Some associations may, on the contrary, prefer to restrict entry, like the so-called “status 
organizations” (Hansmann, 1986), which grant their participants a certain social status (Gordon 
and Babchuk, 1959.) In these organizations, the decision of an individual to join depends not only 
on the characteristics and the price of the collective good provided, but also on the characteristics 
of the members. This kind of association establishes a minimal status level (in social, economic 
or other terms) in addition to membership dues. When membership in an organization provides 
its members with social status, members may decide to limit the number of newcomers. This is 
the case described by Olson (1971):  
“If the top “400” were to become the top “4000”, the benefits to the entrants would be 
offset by the losses of old members, who would have traded an exalted social connection for one 
that might be only respectable" (Olson, 1971, p. 37.)  
 In any case, there exists a trade-off between the size of the organization and the level of 
dues.  
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3.2   K-Symmetric Coalized Equilibrium 
 
We shall now consider a so-called “we-frame” framework, where coordinated initiative of 
a group of K members deciding collectively to make a symmetric voluntary contribution. 
Generally, such coordination is difficult to achieve and the organization costs can be high. 
However, in some cases an existing group which has already met the organization costs may 
facilitate further collective action (Olson, 1971, Ross, 1972, Coleman, 1988). As pointed out in 
the literature (Auman and Dreze, 1974), the aptitude of a group to provide a collective good can 
be partly explained by its origins and the factors that sustain it. The idea that pre-existing 
organizations can facilitate the collective action has been suggested by Coleman (1988) in the 
form of the concept of social capital. 
Groups of individuals who desire to contribute more can have various different origins. 
Besides a pre-existing organization, it may be founded on kinship links or shared social and 
cultural characteristics.   
 
Proposition 7: 
For any NK ≤ , there exists a unique “coalized” K-symmetric  equilibrium such that 
Kidd Ki ∈∀= , and dj = 0 ∀  j∈(N-K).  Moreover, Kd  is increasing in K , θ , and α  and 
decreasing in N , X , and c . The proof is given in Appendix C.4. 
   
Example Sign of Kd :  
 
0=Kd ⇔ 0.=
)(
1
1
1
XNc
N
K
−−
−
−
α
γ
αθα
   (8) 
In the case of αγ −1= , (8) can be written as follows: 
0.=)( 1
1
2 αθα −−+ KXNCN   (9) 
 
Equation (9) has a negative and a positive root denoted ÑK 
 
0<Kd
 if N < ÑK 
0>Kd
 if N> ÑK . 
 
Thus, ÑK is the threshold above which a K-coalition brings a positive voluntary 
contribution.  
 
The propositions 4, 5  and 7 postulate, respectively, that at N-symmetric and K-symmetric 
equilibria, the voluntary contribution decreases with an increase in the external resources X. This 
result illustrates the effect of crowding out currently highlighted by the models of “pure altruism” 
(Andreoni, 1988), where individuals are interested in total provision of the public good. As has 
been shown in a number of theoretical studies, under the “purely altruistic preferences” 
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assumption, voluntary contributions are completely crowded out by public subsidies (Andreoni, 
1988, 1990, Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002). However, this assumption has been challenged by 
empirical facts, notably in the nonprofit area (Steinberg, 1987, Andreoni, 1988, 1990, Ribar and 
Wilhelm, 2002). The assumption of “impurely altruistic preferences” (Andreoni, 1988), 
according to which individuals derive utility not only from total provision of the public good, but 
also from the act of giving, accounts better for the persistence of voluntary contributions in the 
presence of public financial support. Under this assumption, the crowding-out of voluntary 
contributions is incomplete (see for instance Steinberg, 1987.) Moreover, Rose-Ackerman (1986) 
shows the possible crowding-in effect of government grants in situations where voluntary 
contributions and grants are not perfect substitutes. However, in her model, crowding-in effects 
are only possible under the condition that the government is able to impose its rules on the 
organizations it supports concerning the services they provide.  
The result that voluntary contributions are increasing in θ  describes the positive effects of 
the attractiveness of the public good on individual incentives to contribute. This theoretical 
finding is supported by a number of experimental studies, where an increase in the parameter of 
attractiveness leads to an increase in the mean of voluntary contributions, but not necessarily at 
the individual level of each subject (Hichri and Kirman, 2007). 
Finally, according to the proposition above, K agents forming an internal coalition may 
decide to contribute an equal amount while others pay only the compulsory dues. The voluntary 
contribution decreasing in N  sheds light on the character of the sharing between the members of 
the coalition and the rest of the group. Given the size K of the coalition of volunteers, the amount 
of their effort dK being decreasing with N means that the incentive to contribute is smaller as the 
group of volunteers is small compared to the size of the association. Conversely, given N, dK is 
increasing with the size K of the group of volunteers, thus when the coalition may gather a 
growing share of the population. Individuals may be averse to sharing a common good among a 
large number of people (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973.) This 
aversion could result from the homophile preferences often used to explain the formation of 
homogeneous groups of individuals with common features (Cohen, 1977).  
What determines the emergence of homogeneous groups, besides homophily? As the 
sociological literature stresses, the size and composition of the population can also lead to the 
formation of homogeneous groups. For instance, McPherson and Lovin (1987) studied the 
influence of the size and diversity of voluntary associations on the formation of homophile links 
between members. They showed that homophily is not merely a natural tendency of individuals, 
but that the social structure can also favor or constrain individual choices. Therefore, among the 
factors influencing the internal groups in associations, we should distinguish between constrained 
and freely-chosen homophily.  
We shall incorporate this idea into our model in the last section of this paper, by 
introducing individual preferences for the subjective quality of the public good. 
 
 
4.  Voluntary contributions and  heterogeneity of incomes 
 
Going one step further, this section aims to introduce the impact of heterogeneity of 
incomes on the formation of coalitions of volunteers within associations. Heterogeneity of the 
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agents' economic power has to be taken into account through two complimentary aspects: the 
budget constraints and the fact that marginal contribution of one monetary unit to the individual 
utility depends on the level of income. We will introduce these two aspects successively into our 
model. 
 
 
4.1.  Budget constraint and partial K-symmetric equilibrium 
  
Here, we introduce some heterogeneity by imposing the budget constraint that influences 
agents' choices. In the case with budget constraint, members of the association are constrained to 
a level of contributions that cannot exceed the level of id  limited by their income  iw . 
This may result in a coalized equilibrium in which only contributions of a share K of the 
total population N are symmetric.  
Proposition 8: Given a distribution of incomes, there exists a unique value of NK ≤  and 
a unique coalized partially K-symmetric equilibrium, such that 
0}|{== ≥−−∈∀ KkKi dcwkKidd  and cwd jj −=   )( KNj −∈∀ .   
The proof is given in Appendix C. 
 
4.2. Heterogeneity of incomes and non symmetric equilibrium 
 
In this section, we study the relation between the level of voluntary contributions and 
incomes by introducing the non-constant character of the marginal contribution of a monetary 
unit to the individual utility. Taking the individual utility model based on division of the budget 
between private consumption and contributions to the public good, we can consider that the net 
income of the agent i, or ii dcw −−  contributes to her utility in a concave way. Consequently, we 
can note: 
 
 
.)()(=
1=
α
γ
β θ XdNc
N
dcwU j
N
j
iii +++−− ∑
 (10) 
 
 
Proposition 9: There exists a unique equilibrium under constraint, in which the richest 
agents of a sub-group NK ≤  contribute at such a level that their net incomes are reduced to a 
common reference level 0>= 0wdcw ii −−  for all the agents in K , while the agents from 
KN − , whose incomes are less than cw +0 , do not make any voluntary contributions.   
 
For proof see Appendix D. 
 
Proposition 9 shows how the agents choose their level of voluntary contribution at a non-
symmetric equilibrium. In fact, in this case, each agent pays a personalized price for the public 
good. The ability of voluntary organizations to establish personalized prices (or a system of price 
discrimination) has already been stressed in the economic literature (Hansmann, 1981, Ben-Ner, 
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1986.) According to Ben-Ner, the non-market interactions between members, (kinship links, 
neighborhood, common background), as well as the non-profit distribution constraint, allow these 
organizations to reveal demands and to establish personalized prices.  
    The result where all the agents are reduced to the same level 0w  of net income is 
somewhat simplistic. This is due to the fact that in this model, the share of the initial allocation 
dedicated to private consumption corresponds to an homogenous good with a unique technology 
of consumption. However, in real life, disposable income is rather devoted partly to differentiated 
baskets of goods characterized by diversified consumption technologies and partly to savings.   
 
 
5.  Volunteering and subjective quality 
 
Now, let us assume that the agents can contribute to the public good not only money, but 
also their time and effort. One can differentiate three main types of theoretical framework for 
explaining volunteering: pure public good models, private consumption models and investment 
models (Ziemek, 2006.) Pure public good models consider that volunteers are motivated 
exclusively by total provision of the public good. Private consumption models focus on personal 
rewards, like social status or simply a warm glow. Investment models may be considered as a 
special case of private consumption model, as volunteering provides certain benefits associated 
with the accumulation of human and social capital.  
The model we describe below is situated between the "pure public goods" and "private 
consumption" approaches, as the act of volunteering is not independent of the characteristics of 
the public good to which it contributes. We consider that volunteering provides an additional 
utility to the one derived from total provision, as in Steinberg (1987), for instance. Steinberg's 
approach, considered as a "mixed public-private good approach", represents a case of an 
"impurely altruistic model" (Andreoni, 1990). The individual utility function includes the public 
goods provided through the agent's individual voluntary contribution, public resources and the 
contributions of others. The individual contribution and the other agents' contributions are 
complementary when the individual is faced with social comparisons within her group of 
reference. When the individual is motivated only by total provision, her contributions and the 
contributions of others are perfect substitutes.  
In our model, each member i  can contribute to the public good by making a non-
monetary contribution of effort noted iv , which is subjective value. This effort allows agents to 
influence the quality of the public good according to their own preferences. The quality is 
subjective insofar as it cannot always be evaluated objectively. In other words, the quality of a 
good (or a service) is subjective when it is evaluated through individual perceptions rather than 
standardized measures. 
One notable example of the use of subjective quality comes from the field of child day-
care. Here, the measurement of quality is influenced by parents' preferences concerning certain 
service characteristics, making it more subjective than the standards elaborated by experts. For 
instance, it may be important to know whether the provider of the child-care service speaks the 
same language, shares the same values or the same religion. This implies that an individual's 
perception of quality may differ not only from others' perceptions, but also from the more 
objective evaluations made by experts using an index of quality (Farquhar, 1993, Moss, 1994.) 
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As Evers and Riedel (2004) have shown in a German case study, the development of nonprofit 
child-care centers was mainly driven by the desire of some parents to create a service in keeping 
with certain pedagogical, ideological or religious principles. Moreover, as observed in the United 
States, nonprofit child-care centers tend to provide more labor-intensive services, sometimes 
including parent participation, than private ones (Kushman, 1979).  
We therefore suggest that the members of an association can volunteer in the hope of 
influencing the subjective quality of the good or service being provided. In the field of child care, 
for instance, the role of volunteers can consist in organizing activities according to their cultural 
background or pedagogical convictions. In the field of the arts, active members can influence 
programming choices according to their personal tastes. Finally, in a charity helping the poor, the 
more active volunteers can influence the criteria of eligibility or the order of priority (Rose-
Ackerman, 1986.) 
Two aspects must be taken into consideration here:   
- The cost of the effort. 
By convention we measure effort iv  as a fraction of the individual's disposable time that 
is dedicated to the volunteering, or [0,1]∈iv . For i, the effort iv  represents an opportunity cost 
that is proportional to her income. We assume that each agent i  works a length of time 1 to earn 
an income iw . Thus, the opportunity cost can be written as ii wv .  
 - The impact on the subjective value of the good. 
The subjective value of the public good for the agent i depends both on the total amount 
of effort provided by all the volunteers and on the weight of her own effort as a proportion of the 
total. The combination of both can differ according to how “individualistic” the association is. So 
agents can attach more or less value to the public good itself, but they also value their own 
contributions more or less highly.  
 Thus, the subjective level of effort can be written as follows:  
 
.)(1=)(1
1=
iiij
N
j
vvvv +−+−
−∑ δδδ
 (11) 
 where δ  is the parameter of “individualism”. Two extreme cases can be considered:   
    - 0=δ  leads to j
N
j v∑ 1=  and expresses a purely collective orientation. In other words, 
the effort of a volunteer is added to the sum of efforts provided by other agents;  
    - 1=δ  leads to iv  and designates a purely individualistic orientation, where the 
personal contribution is the only one valued, in spite of the effort provided by others.  
 We consider that δ , the so-called parameter of individualism, characterizes the type of 
association. Under some conditions, it is possible to link this parameter with the typology of 
voluntary associations (see for instance Gordon and Babchuk, 1959), defining them as 
“expressive” or “instrumental groups”. The main objective of the first type of association is to 
provide common activities for their members. The members are direct beneficiaries of organized 
activities (for instance a country-club.) A δ  equal to one denotes a purely expressive association, 
inasmuch as participation in its activities provides a direct gratification for the members. On the 
contrary, the main function of so-called instrumental associations is directed outside the 
organization. This kind of association aims to create and maintain a normative condition or a 
commitment (Gordon and Babchuk, p. 25) and exercises a social influence. Examples include 
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associations for the defense of the rights of minorities and the poor, or certain political and 
religious organizations. The extreme case of such an association is denoted by a value of δ  equal 
to zero. In other words, it is assumed that the members are driven by ideological principles or 
common values, rather than the pleasure of participating in a shared activity. In real life, 
voluntary associations can accomplish both functions. For example, some associations may have 
an expressive function at the local level and an instrumental function at the national level. 
Intermediate associations may be situated between the two extreme cases with a δ  more or less 
close to 0 or to 1. 
In our model, we introduce effort into the production function of the public good by 
means of a Cobb-Douglas function. The utility of the agent i is now written as:  
 
βα
γ δδ
θ ))((1)(=
1=1=
ij
N
j
j
N
j
iiiii vvXdNcN
vwdcwU +−+++−−− ∑∑
 (12) 
 with α  and β  ]0,1[∈ . 
In a standard way, each agent i  determines her pecuniary contribution id  and her effort 
iv  so as to maximize her subjective utility iU , according to her rational expectations about the 
levels of voluntary contributions jjij dd −≠∑ =  and effort iiij vv −≠∑ =  made by the other agents. 
 
Proposition 10:  At equilibrium, each agent fixes her levels of voluntary contribution and 
effort ),( ii vd  by attributing to the latter a relative weight depending on her income. The lower 
the income, the higher the relative weight of the effort. In other words, a poorer agent will 
compensate for her weak monetary contribution by a greater effort. Moreover, for all the agents, 
the level of direct effort is an increasing function of the degree of individualism δ .   
 
For proof see Appendix E. 
 
The model above shows that pecuniary contributions and volunteering can well be made 
jointly. This conforms to the stylized facts, whereby monetary donations and volunteering often 
come together. Generally, the explanation proposed for this phenomenon is that donors need to 
control the good use of their donations. In this paper, we put forward the idea that the trade-off 
between monetary contributions and volunteering can be based on the desire to influence the 
quality of the public output. Moreover, the valuation of the public good becomes socially-based, 
to the extent that it depends on the agents' characteristics (culture, education, ideological 
considerations, etc.)  
Here, the concept of service assumes particular importance. The outputs of nonprofit 
organizations are mostly represented by services (Weisbrod, 1977, Hansmann, 1980). It can be 
difficult to evaluate a service when it has both immediate and long-term impacts, or when the 
perceptions of its quality differ across individuals. The diversity of criteria by which a service can 
be appraised influences the possible trade-off between giving and volunteering. Pecuniary 
contributions and volunteering may well influence the characteristics of the service differently. 
Thus, agents can contribute both money and effort. Another interesting issue highlighted in the 
model is the level of effort provided by an agent as a function increasing in δ , the parameter of 
individualism characterizing the association. In other words, the model predicts that volunteering 
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is likely to be more important in expressive associations (Gordon and Babchuk, 1959), i.e. those 
essentially oriented towards the interests of their members. One conclusion we can draw from 
this result is that to attract a greater effort of volunteering, an association should take into account 
the personal interests of its volunteers. This can be achieved through awards, such as public 
recognition and social status, but also through socialization, dialogue and communication (Laville 
and Sainsaulieu, 1997, p. 292). 
This result is in keeping with some stylized facts about volunteering at the international 
level in general, and in the United States and France in particular. 
At the international level, Salamon et al. (2003) highlight the important role of volunteers 
in the field of culture and arts, accounting for a quarter of total volunteering (p. 24). According to 
Schervish and Havens (1997), volunteers in the United States largely benefit from the activities 
they create. Finally, in France, more than half of the members of expressive associations (e.g. 
shared leisure activities, social clubs) participate at least once a week in the shared activities as 
organizers, while this figure is only 34 per cent in the instrumental associations, like those for the 
defence of minority interests. Moreover, nearly half of the time dedicated to volunteering is 
mobilized in the areas of sport, culture and leisure, which are the biggest consumers of this input 
(Prouteau and Wolff, 2004.) The results of Prouteau and Wolff (2004) confirm the hypothesis 
that in France, at least, volunteering by adults is often reinforced by specific needs for services 
(children's education, for instance). In an empirical study using U.S. data on married women's 
voluntary labor, Carlin (2001) finds that participation rates are positively related to the number of 
children. As Ziemek (2006) shows in a cross-country study, the presence of young children in a 
household positively influences the egoism and investment motivation of volunteers.  
As regards the effect of income on volunteering, according to (E.3), the level of effort is a 
decreasing function of w . In other words, the effort of volunteering is likely to rise when the 
wage rate decreases. As empirical support to this finding, we can cite the inverse relation between 
voluntary labor and wage rates documented by Menchik and Weisbrod (1987). In addition, 
Andreoni et al. (1996) find a relatively substantial negative effect of the net wage on volunteer 
hours. However, the effects of wage rate on volunteering may be sensitive to the type of 
volunteers’ motivations or other determinants. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
  
Collective-consumption goods can be provided by voluntary associations. In this paper, 
we consider an important feature of these organizations, concerning the issue of personal 
commitment to a common action. We develop a model of voluntary association of individuals 
who are interested in obtaining advantages from the provision of a common good. At the first 
step, we consider a set of agents who benefit from a quantity of a good in a uniform manner. We 
show the existence of several symmetric and non-symmetric equilibria corresponding to the 
different modes of emergence of associations identified in the sociological literature (Laville and 
Sainsaulieu, 1997). At the N-symmetric equilibrium corresponding to the case of a “for-self” 
association, all the agents are equal in the sense that they all make a fixed voluntary contribution. 
Voluntary contributions are crowded out by compulsory payments and by exogenous resources. 
At the K-symmetric equilibrium, where one can distinguish between two categories of agents, the 
“strong” and the “weak” ones, only K agents make voluntary contributions. This case 
19 
corresponds to the case of an association created “for others”. Here, the effects of crowding out 
are also present. Moreover, the level of voluntary contributions diminishes with the size of the 
organization. Both at the N-symmetric and the K-symmetric equilibria, the amount of voluntary 
contributions grows with the attractiveness of the public good.  
Then, by introducing a budget constraint, we show the existence of a unique partial K-
symmetric equilibrium, in which the K richest agents give an equal amount, while the others give 
the rest of their disposable income after dues. When it is assumed that the net income of the agent 
enters the utility function in a concave way, we find that there exists a non-symmetric 
equilibrium at which all the agents fix their voluntary contributions in such a way as to make 
their net disposable incomes equal. Finally, in the same configuration and after re-introducing the 
budget constraint, we show the existence of a unique equilibrium at which only the richest 
members form an internal coalition to make additional voluntary contributions. The members of 
this group inside the association give an amount that makes their net incomes equal. 
At the second step, we introduce the quality of the public good into the basic model. Here, 
quality is considered simultaneously as a public and private component of the good provided, 
while quantity is generally considered as the only feature of the public good. An exception is 
provided by Ben-Ner (1986), who considers quality as a public component and quantity as a 
private component, in the sense that consumers only buy the quantity they demand. The model 
presented above is reinforced by a number of works in the empirical literature concerning the 
positive relationship between voluntary contributions and the attractiveness of the public good, 
incomplete crowding-out phenomena, the importance of the organization size and its effects on 
voluntary contributions, and the positive link between incomes and the level of voluntary 
contributions. Moreover, according to the stylized facts, the effort of volunteering is more 
important in the organizations oriented towards the direct interest of the members. Thus, the 
rewards of volunteers are not pecuniary. Rather, the model proposed above stresses how 
dialogue, social acknowledgment, and what some call “accepted differentiation” (Laville and 
Sainsaulieu, 1997) are important. 
Even if most of the results of the model essentially correspond to the stylized facts, they 
can depend on the structure of the model. An important assumption made in the model is that 
individuals may desire not only to increase production of the public good, but also to influence its 
quality by volunteering. However, this does not exclude other possible incentives of volunteers, 
which are not taken into account in the model. Moreover, the incentives of volunteers to devote 
time and effort may differ, depending on the people and the social context. The degrees of 
motivation of individuals can also be heterogeneous. This heterogeneity of incentives could be an 
interesting issue for future works. 
Finally, the main contribution of this paper consists in highlighting voluntary association 
as a group of individuals formed around a common intention. But this does not exclude that 
possibility that the members of an association may have their own aspirations and conceptions of 
the good or service they want to provide. This idea is formalized by introducing the concept of 
subjective quality, according to which the perceptions of the quality of a good (or service) may 
well differ across persons. Accepting these differences, what has been called "accepted 
differentiation", allows the actors to promote a collective action. As Laville and Sainsaulieu 
(1997) observed, associative activity is an exercise in social cohesion; it does not exclude the 
expression of differences that come together around a shared project. In other words, as the 
saying goes, "people can share the same bed without sharing the same dreams."  
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APPENDICES 
 
A  Proofs of propositions 1 and 2 
 Let us assume first symmetric voluntary contributions, in other words dd i =  for each i , 
and note dcc +′ = . Now, the equation (2) can be re-written as  
 
,)(1=)( αγ XcNNNf +′  (A.1) 
 To make )(Nf  defined and continuous, let us assume that  
 
 
0,≥+′ XcN
 
 or that  
 
.= 0N
c
XN
′
−≥
 (A.2) 
 When 0<X  (namely, in the presence of fixed costs), this condition means that the number of 
participants must be high enough for the sum of individual contributions c′  to compensate the 
fixed cost X . 
When 0≥X , this condition holds for any value of 0≥N .  
The derivative of the production function of the public good (A.1) can be written as 
follows:  
 
.)(
)(
=
d
d
11 αγ
γγα
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′
XcNN
XcN
N
f
 (A.3) 
 Given (A.2), the sign of the derivative will be the one of the numerator (A.3), or  
 
).)((=
d
d XcNsg
N
f
sg γγα −−′
 (A.4) 
 (i.) When X ≥ 0, namely in the presence of public subsidies,   
 
If γ ≥ α,  
 
.0,
d
d N
N
f ∀≤
 (A.5) 
In this case, association does not make sense as the sharing rule described by γ cancels the gain of 
individual utility.  
  
If γ < α,   
The variation of the sign of the derivative is given in the table below. 
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Table  A.1: Variations of the production function with N in the presence of external 
subsidies 
  
N  
.)(=1 c
XN
′− γα
γ
 
 
 
< 0 0 >0 
 
  
 
 Beyond 1N , each additional contribution leads to a gain in individual utility. There is no 
overcrowding, but there exists a minimal size of association which is necessary for association to 
make sense. 
 
 (ii.) When 0<X , namely in the presence of fixed costs, two cases need to be studied:   
If αγ ≤ , the production function is increasing with the number of contributors if their number is 
higher than 0N . In this case, there is no overcrowding.  
 
.0,>)( NXcN ∀−−′ γγα
 (A.6) 
 Thus,  
 
.=0,
d
d
0N
c
XN
N
f
′
−≥∀≥
 (A.7) 
  
If αγ > ,  
 
0=)( XcN γγα −−′
 (A.8) 
 for a number of participants N  equal to  
 
.)(=1 c
XN
′−
−
αγ
γ
 (A.9) 
 the table of variations of the derivative will be the following: 
 
 
Table  A.2: Variations of the production function with N  in the presence of fixed costs 
   
N  
.)(=1 c
XN
′−
−
αγ
γ
 
 
 
>0 0 <0 
  
 
  
Beyond 1N , the production function generates overcrowding. In other words, when the 
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number of participants is higher than 1N , the amount of good produced diminishes with the 
number of members.  
Note that 01 > NN . The number of members 0N  represents a minimal size of association. 
Beyond this size and up to 1N , effects of overcrowding are absent, namely the production of the 
public good increases with the number of members.  
  
 
A.1  Extension 1 
 
 Now let us suppose that K  first members, founders for instance, have fixed the level of 
the voluntary contribution, while the newcomers contribute only the compulsory amount c. For 
each ],[ 0 KNN ∈ , the previous results hold. 
Beyond this threshold, KN >∀  the production function is written as follows:  
 
.)(1=)( αγ XKdNcNNf ++  (A.10) 
 This situation is equivalent to the previous case with cc =′  and  
 
.= KdXY +
 (A.11) 
 Thus, the previous results are found with  
 
c
YN −=0  
 and  
 
.)(=1 c
YN
γα
γ
−
 (A.12) 
 An important issue here is to situate 1N  with regard to K .  
If 0≥Y  and αγ < ,  
 
K
c
YN ≥
− )(=1 γα
γ
 
 if and only if  
 
.)( cKY γαγ −≥
 (A.13) 
 By substituting (A.11) in (A.13) we obtain  
 
.])([ XdcK γγα ≤−−
 (A.14) 
   
    - If the term of the equation (A.14) 0>)( dc −− γα , i.e. if the compulsory amount is 
high enough relative to voluntary contributions, then we obtain  
 
.=)(< sdc
XK
−− γα
γ
 (A.15) 
  
Therefore we obtain the following table of variations, where two alternative cases depend 
on the relative position of K with regard to s . 
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Table  A.3: Position of K relatively to s 
 
 N0  s   
  K N1 
 
< 0 > 0  < 0 < 0  > 0 
      K  
 
< 0  > 0   > 0  
  
 
  
Thus, for a population that is large enough, there is no overcrowding.  
 
    - In the case where 0)( ≤−− dc γα  and 0≥X , the inequality (A.14) holds for any 
0≥K
 (here we are in the alternative case 1NK ≤ ).  
If 0<X , we find the two alternative cases above. 
Finally, if 0<Y , we find the previous results.  
  
A.2  Extension 2 
 
 If beyond the number K it is possible to make voluntary contributions, the situation of 
every member is improved. Overcrowding remains absent, but it can occur when 0<Y  and 
αγ > , beyond a threshold possibly moved forward. 
 
A.3  Extension 3 
 If below K, the voluntary contributions vary, one can substitute Kd  by j
K
j dD ∑ 1== . The 
result still holds. 
 
B.   Proofs of proposition 3 and corollary 3.1 
  
B.1  Proof of proposition 3 
 The utility for the member N is written as  
 
,)(= αγ
θ
NNNNN dYN
dcwU ++−−
 (B.1) 
 where  
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1
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 N has an incentive to contribute when  
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∂
∂
N
N
d
U
 (B.3) 
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 Thus, we obtain the following condition:  
 
.)( 1 αγθα −+≥ NN dYN  (B.5) 
 Therefore, N will have incentives to contribute a positive amount if and only if  
 
.)( 1
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 The right-hand term is increasing in N .  
 
Then, formation of the internal group is studied in the situation of symmetry. In other 
words, here we analyze the situation where a group of individuals in an association each decide to 
provide an equal amount. This is equivalent to the decision to raise the compulsory payment. 
Now, the initial individual utility is written as  
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 We study the derivative with regard to c :  
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 We study the variations of the right-hand side term of (B.9):  
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B.2  Proof of corollary 3.1 
 The level *c  is obtained from (B.8) as solution of 0=
c
U
∂
∂
. It can be written as:  
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Now the variation of *c  as a function of N  can be studied:  
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 Given the assumption 0≥X  et γα > ,  
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C.  Proofs of propositions 4 to 8 
  
C.1  Proof of proposition 4 
 Given the utility function  
    ,)(= αγ
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     (C.1) 
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 The first-order condition for a N-symmetric equilibrium gives the optimal value of voluntary 
contributions without budget constraint1. 
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 From equation (C.3) follows that *d  is decreasing in X and C and increasing in θ  and α  . 
The variations of d* with N depend on the sign of the derivative   
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If X≤0  0
*
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∀
 N then d* is a decreasing function of N. 
 
                                                 
1
 The second order conditions hold if 0≥X  and 1<α . 
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If X>0 0
*
=
∂
∂
N
d
  
⇔ N= γαα
γ
θα
1
1 ])1
1
([ −−
+
X
=N* 
d* is a decreasing function in N for N<N* 
and increasing with N for N>N*  
where N* is a growing function of θ and decreasing function of X . 
■ 
 
C.2. Proof of proposition 5 
In the case of a N-coalition, the utility function for any Ni ∈ can be written as follows 
,))((= αγ
θ XdcN
N
dcwU i +++−−  and 
.))((1= 1
1
α
γθα
−
−
++
+−
∂
∂
XdcN
N
d
U i
 
The F.O.C. gives .)(= 11
1
N
XNcdc NN −=+ −
−
− α
γα
αθα
  
 Following the assumption X≥0, Nd  is an increasing function of N and a decreasing function of 
X.  
■ 
 
C.3 Proof of proposition 6 
Denote c*=d*+c for the “non-coalized equilibrium” and Nc = cd N +  for the coalized one. 
 
Nc >c* ⇔
1
1
1 1
+
−
−
−
>
α
γ
α
γα
N
N  provided that 0<γ<α <1 ⇔  )(1
1
γα
γα
−−
− >
N
N  ⇔ 1> N
1
 
 
■ 
 
 C.4 Proof of proposition 7 
 
The proof proceeds in two steps. 
First, let us consider the K-coalition. Members of the coalition determine a level of contribution 
dK maximizing the individual utility of each of them. 
Denote d the individual voluntary contribution of the coalition's members, then their utility 
function can be written:  
 ,)(= αγ
θ XKdNc
N
dcwUKi ii +++−−∈∀  (C.4) 
under the rational expectation that members outside the K-coalition do not bring any contribution 
over and above the compulsory amount c. 
 
 Maximizing (C.4) yields  
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N
KXKdNc K                                            (C.5) 
thus 
.
)(
=
1
1
K
XNc
N
K
d K
−−
−α
γ
θα
 (C.6) 
To show that this actually defines an equilibrium, it is then necessary to validate the above 
rational expectation. 
Let us consider the individuals outside the K-coalition: 
 
,)(=, αγ
θ XddKdNc
N
dcwUKNi ii
K
iii +++++−−−∈∀ −   (C.7) 
where .=
,
∑
≠−∈
−
ijKNj
ji dd  
 
FOC give ,)()(= 1
1
i
K
i dXKdNcN
d
−
−
−+−−αγ
θα
  (C.8) 
where d
-i >0 iff ∃ j ∈ N-K: dj >0 and d-i = 0 conversely. 
 
By substituting (C.5) in (C.8) provided K > 1, α < 1, and thus 11
1
>−αK , 
,]1[)(= 1
1
1
1
ii dKN
d
−
−−
−−−
αα
γ
θα
 and then di < 0. 
Thus, i does not bring any (positive) voluntary contribution, validating the expectation of the 
members of the K-coalition. 
 
From (C.6) it follows that Kd  is increasing in θ , α , and K  and decreasing in N , X , and c .  
 
C.5  Proof of proposition 8 
 
 Let us rank the population of agents in decreasing order of incomes as follows: 
wiwij j ≤⇒> . 
The result is a straightforward consequence of the properties shown by Foray, Thoron, 
and Zimmermann (2007) applied to the previous model of equilibrium with constraints. The 
distribution of voluntary contributions is presented in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: The distribution of voluntary contributions 
 
   
 
Now, the individual utility is written for any Ki ∈  as follows:  
 
,)(= αγ
θ XDKdNc
N
dcwU KNKKi
K
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−
 (C.9) 
 where  
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>
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 or  
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K
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 (C.10) 
 where  
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j
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 For any Ki ∈ ,  
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∂
∂ α
γ
θα XdcK
N
K
d
U KNK
K
i
 (C.11) 
 By assuming 0=K
i
d
U
∂
∂
, we obtain an optimal value of contributions for any Ki ∈ :  
 
.
1])[(= 1
1
c
K
X
N
Kd KNK −−Ω− −−αγ
θα
 (C.12) 
 According to Foray, Thoron and Zimmermann (2007), the value of K  is adjusted in such a way, 
that Kk dcw ≥−  and 
K
K dcw <1 −+ .  
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D.  Proof of proposition 9 
 
The proof proceeds in two steps. 
In the first step, we compute the individual levels of contribution without any constraint. Then in 
the second step, we introduce budget constraints and the necessity for voluntary contributions to 
be positive or zero. 
 
D.1. Step 1: Contributions without budget constraint 
 Now, the first order condition is written as  
 
.
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=
1
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1
α
γβ
αθβ
−
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 The second order condition becomes  
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 (D.2) 
 The non-constrained equilibrium is obtained by assuming 0=
i
i
d
U
∂
∂
 Ni ∈∀  under condition  
 
0.>ii dcw −−  (D.3) 
 We obtain therefore  
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 It follows consequently that ji ≠∀   
 
ββ
ββ
−−
−−−−
11 )(=)( jjii dcwdcw  
 or that Ni ∈∀ , 0= wdcw ii −− , and thus  
 
.= 0 cwwd ii −−  (D.5) 
 Thus, after voluntary contribution, all the agents are brought to the same level of net income 0w .  
Now, we can write  
 
),(=)(= 00
1=1=
wcNwcNwd j
N
j
j
N
j
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 from which, by substituting in (D4) we obtain  
 αγβ
αθβ
−−
−+Ω 10
1
0 )(
=
NwXNw  (D.6) 
 It follows that 0w  solution of the implicit equation (D.6) is strictly positive, which satisfies the 
condition (D.3). 
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D.2 . Step 2 : Budget constraints 
 
We now introduce budget constraints: ∀i∈N, di  ≥ 0 and di  ≤  wi  - c. In a solution under 
constraint, di  < 0 becomes di   = 0, while  di  >  wi  - c becomes  di  =  wi  - c. 
Nevertheless, di  >  wi  - c ⇔  wi  - c -  w0  >  wi  - c and thus ⇔ w0 < 0, which contradicts 
the previous assertion. 
Thus the constraint  di  ≥ 0 still remains. 
Here  di  < 0 if and only if  wi  < w0 + c, and the set of agents with incomes lower than   
w0 + c do not make any voluntary contribution at all. 
 
 As in Foray, Thoron, and Zimmermann (2007), if the N agents are ranked in decreasing 
order of incomes, there exists a NK ≤  satisfying the following conditions: 
The individual utility is written Ki ∈∀   
 
.)()(=
1=
α
γ
β θ XdNc
N
dcwU j
K
j
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 (D.7) 
 In the same way as above, Ki ∈∀  
cwwd ii −− 0= . 
However, this time  
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 and consequently, 0w  is solution of the implicit equation  
 
.))((= 1010 αγβ
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 (D.8) 
  
 
E.  Proof of proposition 10 
 To simplify the expression of the utility function, let us note iww = , idm = , 
idXNcM −++= , ivf = , ivF −− )(1= δ , γ
θ
N
z =
 and ii dcwx −−= . The latter represents the 
share of the budget of i available for her private consumption.  
Thus, the agent i is solving the following:  
 
βα )()(=),,( fFmMzwfxfmxMaxU +++−
 (E.1) 
 under a budget constraint  
 
0=wcmx −++
 (E.2) 
 Using the Kuhn and Tuker theorem and noting the multiplicator corresponding to the constraint 
(E.2) as λ , we write the marginal utilities and the respective first order conditions (the marginal 
utilities are proportional to the prices):  
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 From (i) it follows that 1=λ .  
Consequently, the first order conditions (ii) and (iii) can be written as  
 
)()(=)( 1 iimMfFz ′++ −αβα
 
 and  
 
)()(=)( 1 iiifFwmMz ′++ −βαβ
 
 By making a cross product of the terms of these equations, we obtain:  
 
)(=)( mMfFw ++ βα
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